Khadafi dub biography of rory
The inner-city parish of La Vega sits in the lush mountain terrain of Western Caracas. Roughly 130,000 poor residents are cordoned off sociologically from nearby El Paraíso, a wealthy neighborhood that supplies the clients for the upscale shopping center that separates the two communities. In La Vega, the bottom 20 percent of households live on US$125 per month, while the average family income is $US409. Well over a third of households are led by a single mother. Proletarians of mixed African, indigenous, and European ancestries populate the barrio’s informal economies.[1]
In Venezuela, one of the most urbanized countries in Latin America, these households constitute a key demographic base of chavismo. Six years ago, the journalist Jacobo Rivero asked a 50-year-old black woman from La Vega what would happen if Chávez died. The Bolivarian process “is irreversible,” she told him, its roots are too deep to be easily torn asunder in the absence of el comandante. In the years since Chávez’s rise to the presidency in 1999—an interval of unprecedented popular political participation and education for the poor—the woman had learned, for the first time, the history of African slavery and the stories of her ancestors. The historical roots of injustice were being demystified, their causes sorted out. Dignity was being restored in inner-city communities, and their political confidence was on the rise. There had been motive, it now seemed to her, behind the manufactured ignorance of the dispossessed.[2] The “Venezuelan people stood up,” political theorist George Ciccariello-Maher observes, “and it is difficult if not impossible to tell a people on their feet to get back down on their knees.”[3]
The residents of La Vega, Petare, San Agustín, and 23 de Enero, among the other poor urban barrios of Caracas, entered an extended period of public commiseration, of shared mourning, on March 5, 2012, when Vice President Nicolás Maduro 2011 final battle of the First Libyan Civil War For other uses, see Battle of Sirte. Libya Libyan Arab Jamahiriya The Battle of Sirte was the final and most decisive battle of the First Libyan Civil War, beginning when the National Liberation Army attacked the last remnants of the Libyan army still loyal to Muammar Gaddafi in his hometown and designated capital of Sirte, on the Gulf of Sidra. As of September 2011, Sirte and Bani Walid were the last strongholds of Gaddafi loyalists and the National Transitional Council hoped that the fall of Sirte would bring the war to an end. The battle and its aftermath marked the final collapse of the four-decade Gaddafi regime. Both Gaddafi and his son, Mutassim, were wounded and captured, The Libyan government has retreated to a ship off the coast. The President of Yemen has fled from his capital – apparently disguised as a woman. Boko Haram controls swathes of Northern Nigeria. South Sudan – the newest country in the world – celebrates its independence in Civil War. Over 10,000 civilians were casualties in Afghanistan last year. (And if we don’t concentrate on Darfur, Somalia, Israel-Palestine, or Pakistan, it is not because their issues are resolved, but simply because of the scale of horrors elsewhere). All this before we return to Syria’s 3 million refugees, or the Islamic State, which now occupies an area larger than the United Kingdom, spilling across Western Iraq. Or the accelerating advance of the Russian-backed ‘separatists’ in Ukraine. The world has not been this dangerous or unstable for 20 years. And we have – it seems – no confidence that we can do anything about any of it. But only fifteen years ago, the West felt it could deal with such situations. Scholars studied how the US had worked in the Philippines before the First World War, the Marshall plan for Europe after the Second World War, and the British-Malayan Emergency. And believed that they could extract lessons for success, from the reconstruction of Germany, or the success of Malaysia. The US Rand corporation wrote a book called ‘the Beginners’ Guide to Nation-Building” which specified exactly how many foreign troops would be required to stabilise another country (it insisted that the culture or the history of the country was largely irrelevant – what mattered was the numbers). The UN asserted a ‘responsibility to protect’, encouraging States to lead humanitarian interventions. And when the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo or Sierra Leone seemed relatively successful, the only regret seemed to be that we had not intervened more in other countries – such as Rwanda or Darfur. The recipe, people believed, was called ‘state-build Battle of Sirte (2011)
Battle of Sirte Part of the Second Gulf of Sidra offensive of the First Libyan Civil War
Situation in Sirte just prior to the 20 October assaultBelligerents Commanders and leaders Hamid Hassy
Mustafa Bin Dardef †
Touhami Zayani
Essam Baghhar
Yunus al-AbdaliMuammar Gaddafi (WIA)
Mutassim Gaddafi (WIA) †
Abu-Bakr Yunis Jabr †
Mansour Dhao (POW)
Abdel Rahman Abdel Hamid (POW)
Sayyid Gaddaf al-Dam (POW)Units involved Unknown People's Guard Strength 16,000 fighters
163–900technicals 1,000–5,000 fighters (NTC claim) Casualties and losses 265 killed,
2,030 wounded 868 killed,
200 wounded,
150+ captured 800 civilians killed (NTC claim)
2,151 civilians killed (Loyalist claim)
A Better Understanding of Intervention